Using data on 17 industrial countries from 1982 to 2003 and controlling for a wide array of factors, this paper finds that higher exchange rate volatility increases the unemployment rate.
Introduction
There are various hypotheses according to which exchange rate volatility may affect unemployment. Some papers argue that this effect depends on the characteristics of the labor market. Specifically, Andersen and Sørensen (1988) argue that if trade unions are strong, volatile exchange rates may lead to excessive wage hikes, lowering employment. Similarly, Belke and Kaas (2004) argue that if labor market rigidities improve workers' bargaining position, thus increasing wages and lowering the net return to firms, higher exchange rate volatility is likely to induce firms to delay job creation. According to Belke and Gros (2001) , even a temporary increase in exchange rate volatility can induce firms to postpone the creation of jobs since volatile exchange rates raise the uncertainty of future earnings and thus the 'option value of waiting' (Dixit 1989) . They argue that although this concept concerns investment projects, hiring workers represents an investment in the sense that there are high costs to reversing this decision, particularly if dismissal regulation is strict.
Volatile exchange rates may also increase unemployment via lower investment in physical capital. Investment may be reduced because higher volatility usually entails increased uncertainty. However, as Darby et al. (1999) argue theoretically, the effect of exchange rate volatility on investment may be either negative or positive, depending on specific characteristics of the respective industry such as scrapping prices, opportunity costs of waiting as well as input costs and output prices.
So far there are only few empirical studies analyzing the effect of exchange rate volatility on unemployment. In a series of papers, Belke and coauthors study the impact of exchange rate volatility in the Mercosur area (Belke and Gros 2002a) , in central and eastern Europe (Belke 2005) , within the EU (Belke and Gros 2001) and between Euroland and the US (Belke and Gros 2002b) . In each case they find exchange rate volatility to adversely affect unemployment.
Focusing on the case of Germany, Stirböck and Buscher (2000) also find some evidence that higher volatility increases unemployment.
There are also few studies on the investment effect of exchange rate volatility. For example, Goldberg (1993) finds that, in the United States, exchange rate volatility tended to expand investment in manufacturing durables industries in the 1970s, but was more likely to be associated with investment contractions in the 1980s. Furthermore, she finds that it tended to depress investment in US non-manufacturing industries. Darby et al. (1999) find that, between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, exchange rate volatility depressed investment in Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. This paper studies empirically the impact of exchange rate volatility on unemployment. It innovates in three important respects. First, it is the first to use data from all major industrial countries. Second, it uses a new index of exchange rate volatility. Third, in contrast to previous papers, it employs a large set of controls.
Data and methodology
Our variable of interest uses GARCH (1, 1) volatility of real effective exchange rate monthly percentage change (for definitions and sources of all variables, see Table 1 ). As the data on our other variables are in annual frequency, we calculate annual averages of the monthly exchange rate volatility data. GARCH measures of conditional volatility are a good proxy for uncertainty since the latter is best defined as the variance of the stochastic, unpredictable component of a variable. They are also superior to unconditional measures such as the standard deviation since the latter ignore relevant information on the random process generating the exchange rate. Therefore, our measure of exchange rate volatility appears to be better suited than the ones used in previous papers studying the unemployment effect of exchange rate volatility, which almost exclusively use the standard deviation.
To avoid omitted variables bias, we control for the impact of all other major factors that have been found to determine the unemployment rate. This is in contrast to all previous papers estimating the unemployment effect of exchange rate volatility, which use hardly any controls. In our baseline specification, we control for six major labor market institutions as well as for product market regulation, business cycle fluctuations, their interaction with exchange rate volatility and the share of trade in GDP. In our first robustness check, we use random rather than fixed effects to control for unobserved country-specific effects. In our second robustness check, we use a measure of centralization rather than coordination of wage bargaining. In our third check, we substitute labor and consumption tax rates for the tax wedge. In our fourth and fifth checks, we use disaggregated measures of employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits, respectively. In our sixth, seventh and eighth checks, we additionally control for active labor market policies, central bank independence and macroeconomic shocks, respectively. 
Results
The coefficient on 'exchange rate volatility' is statistically significant in each of our regressions (Table 2 ). Higher volatility is correlated with higher unemployment in the following year. In most robustness checks, the size of the coefficient is very similar to the estimate from our baseline specification.
In line with previous studies, our results suggest that the magnitude of the effect is small. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the 'exchange rate volatility' variable is associated with an increase in unemployment of between 0.21 and 0.36 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
Finally, a brief comment on our estimates for the control variables used in our regressions to explain the unemployment rate (Table 2) . By and large, they accord with the previous literature on the determinants of unemployment (for a survey, see Bassanini and Duval 2006 , Annex 1).
For example, we find that higher labor taxes, higher unemployment benefits replacement rates, tighter dismissal protection for workers with regular contracts, lower expenditure on active labor market policies, less central bank independence and stronger macroeconomic shocks are likely to raise unemployment. Additionally, we find a higher degree of trade openness to be associated with a lower unemployment rate. These results, as well as the significant estimates for the other controls, underline the importance of controlling for all major factors that affect the unemployment rate when analyzing the impact of exchange rate volatility. Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation for regular contracts. The ratings are scaled to range from 0 (least restrictive) to 0.6 (most restrictive) Bassanini and Duval (2006) Employment protection legislation temporary contracts
Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation for temporary contracts. The ratings are scaled to range from 0 (least restrictive) to 0.6 (most restrictive) Bassanini and Duval (2006) Exchange rate volatility Annual average of GARCH(1,1) volatility of real effective exchange rate monthly percent change IMF (2008) Initial unemployment benefits replacement rate Gross unemployment benefits during the first year of unemployment as a decimal fraction of previous gross wage earnings. Averages across two income situations (100% and 67% of average production worker earnings) and three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) Bassanini and Duval (2006) Interest rate shock Difference between 10-year nominal government bond yield (in %) and annual change in the GDP deflator (in %) Product market regulation Indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in the following seven nonmanufacturing industries: gas, electricity, post, telecoms (mobile and fixed services), passenger air transport, railways (passenger and freight services) and road freight. The ratings are scaled to range from 0 (least restrictive) to 0.6 (most restrictive) Bassanini and Duval (2006) Tax wedge Sum of personal income tax plus employee's and employer's social security contributions less cash benefits as a decimal fraction of total labor cost for an employee earning the average production worker wage; single-earner couple with two children Bassanini and Duval (2006) Terms of trade shock Logarithm of the relative price of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP [(M/Y) log (P M /P Y )] Bassanini and Duval (2006) Total factor productivity shock
Deviation of the logarithm of total factor productivity from its trend. Trend growth rate of total factor productivity calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 100) Bassanini and Duval (2006) Trade union density The share of workers affiliated to a trade union; decimal fraction Bassanini and Duval (2006) Unemployment benefits duration Unemployment benefit duration in years Bassanini and Duval (2006) Unemployment rate Unemployed as a percentage of the civilian labor force (harmonized rates) OECD ( Pooled least squares estimates with country-specific fixed effects, except for regression 2 which uses generalized least squares with country-specific random effects. The sample consists of 17 industrial countries. The sample period is 1982 to 2003. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions additionally control for the impact of time trend. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters at the country level, are reported in parentheses. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level.
b)
The Wald χ 2 statistic is 434.30***. The Hausman test is not applicable since the model fails to meet its asymptotic assumptions. Pooled least squares estimates with country-specific fixed effects, except for regression 4 which uses generalized least squares with country-specific random effects. The sample consists of 17 industrial countries. The sample period is 1982 to 2003. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions additionally control for the impact of time trend. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters at the country level, are reported in parentheses. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level.
The Wald χ 2 statistic is 9.05. The Hausman test is not applicable since the model fails to meet its asymptotic assumptions.
